Wednesday, June 21, 2023

Competition law must apply to PSUs. Coal India case is a good start

While there may be welfare motivations for subsidising bus travel or fertilisers, it hurts private players whose goods and services compete in the same market.

21 June, 2023
The Print

In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court held that the Competition Act applies to Coal India Limited regardless of its status as a public sector undertaking. This is quite a remarkable outcome and should lead to a debate on the differential treatment of PSUs in various spheres of the economy. A competitive market is the bedrock of a modern economy. A lot of attention is paid to the excesses of private firms. But equal thought must be given to monopolies that are created by government diktat, or state-owned firms, which compete with the private sector.

The CIL ruling

Coal India Limited (CIL) is a public sector monopoly. It was accused of abusing its dominant position in the production and delivery of non-coking coal to thermal producers. The Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) objected to this, saying that because it operated coal mines under the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1973, the Competition Act should not apply. Their argument was that the very process of nationalisation gives ownership and control of the coal mines to the State, so that a scarce resource can be distributed to serve the common good. This implies that CIL does not operate in the commercial sphere. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) had among other arguments, relied on the findings of the Raghavan Committee, which had said that a State monopoly could not be allowed to operate in a state of inefficiency…State monopolies must fall in line and operate in the midst of forces of competition. The Supreme Court has refused the CIL’s plea, and remanded the matter back to the CCI to decide the issue on merits. The applicability of competition law to Coal India is a step forward.

State-owned enterprises and the economy

It is useful to ask how state-owned enterprises interact with private players, and the impact they may have on markets. In many instances, these are monopolies, often because entry is restricted to private players. Take the example of railways, which is a monopoly because India does not allow private players to operate trains, at least in the area of passenger services. This may help to keep prices low for consumers, but it is often at the cost of the quality of service, and the pockets of the tax-payer. One could argue that provision of rail services should be considered as an economic activity regardless of who offers it, and principles of competition should apply.

State-owned enterprises also compete with the private sector in offering goods and services. Take the example of Air India, which until recently competed with private airlines, or the various public sector banks (PSBs) which compete with private lenders. While one may not observe a direct violation of competition law, these firms get preferential treatment from the government, and their presence can affect competitive market dynamics. As an example: considering the amount of losses that Air India incurred while it was government owned, it affected the prices and profitability of private airlines. Tax-payer money was used to prop up a zombie firm, that had adverse implications on the private firms.

In the example of public sector banks (PSBs), there is an implicit guarantee on the deposits kept in these banks. This is an unfair advantage relative to private ones who only get an insurance coverage from the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) of Rs 5 lakh per account. In the event of a financial crisis, depositors flee private banks for “safety” of the public banks, potentially hurting the public banks, and leading to inefficient resource allocation overall. When the government continuously infuses capital to keep the PSBs from shutting down, it is using taxpayer money to prop up bad banks. Private banks, on the other hand, have to go through much more scrutiny when they ask for capital from their investors. In the listed firms space as well, rules are relaxed for public enterprises relative to private firms.

Governments often provide fiscal incentives to their entities, or subsidise access to their services. While there may be welfare related motivations for subsidising bus travel or the use of specific fertilisers, the subsidy hurts private players whose goods and services compete in the same market. Once again, such instances may not be a violation of competition law, yet they do impact the competitiveness of market participants.

The fundamental question to ask is if the government should be involved in the production of many of these goods and services. Welfare can be achieved through direct benefit transfers and does not necessarily require the government to act as a player itself. While state-owned enterprises continue to exist, adequate emphasis should be paid to the issue of competitive neutrality. The premise of competitive neutrality is that governments refrain from using its legislative or fiscal powers to advantage their own businesses over the private sector. This is a principle also outlined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which suggests that in a competitive neutral environment public and private enterprises should face the same set of rules, and the former should not get any advantage by virtue of their contact with the State.

Wednesday, June 7, 2023

Instead of mandating MPS norms, SEBI should look at why promoters don’t like going to market

If India wants access to global capital, then the rules in India cannot be orders of magnitude more stringent than their global counterparts.

07 June, 2023
The Print

The Securities and Exchanges Board of India has proposed to tighten the disclosure norms for foreign portfolio investors. In March, SEBI had asked FPIs to disclose any material change in their structure and common ownership within seven working days. These changes seem to be the outcome of the Hindenburg episode that rattled Indian equity markets and shares of Adani firms for some time. SEBI should revisit its rationale for the disclosure requirements from FPIs and only ask for those limited disclosures that serve its purpose.

The story so far

One of the allegations in the Hindenburg report was that Adani Group companies were violating the minimum public shareholding (MPS) norms laid down by SEBI. The MPS norms require that a listed company in India should have at least 25 per cent of its shares held by the public. The Hindenburg report suggested that the group was investing in overseas funds, creating layers of such funds, and subsequently having foreign portfolio investors (FPIs) invest the funds back into the company. The ultimate owner, after combing through such multiple layers of ownership, therefore, was the Adani family, thus violating the 25 per cent MPS rule. FPIs are required to disclose certain specific information about their ultimate beneficial owners. When the Supreme Court set up a committee to look into the matter, one of its mandates was to assess whether SEBI had failed in regulating FPIs. The committee’s report suggests that SEBI had not slipped on this count.

MPS and FPIs

It is useful to ask what, if anything, Indian equity markets gain by the MPS rule, and consequently, the disclosure norms on FPIs. If you own a firm, the decision of how much of it to retain and how much to sell to the public should be your discretion. This decision is granted to the government as the deadline for public sector enterprises to follow the rule keeps getting extended. The logic of differentially applying the rule to private firms is unclear.

The regulator claims that if very few shares are held by the market, then the shares will not be very liquid, and will have a lower price. But this is detrimental to the promoter, and in the promoter’s interest to have a liquid market in its shares. If the promoter still chooses to not sell 25 per cent to the market, then that should be their decision. Similarly, wanting to have a complex shareholding structure should be the promoter’s right. If the regulator is worried about insider trading and price manipulation, then there are plenty of regulatory tools to deal with those. For example, SEBI recently proposed more changes to the existing Insider Trading Regulations. One can debate the necessity of these changes, but that is a separate issue. We need to look deeper into why promoters don’t like going to the market, instead of mandating that they do.

This brings us to the question of disclosure of ultimate beneficiaries of FPIs. It is entirely possible that you invest in a fund, which then invests in another fund in some other country and that fund ends up investing in an Indian firm. There need not always be something fraudulent about such a transaction. In a globalised world, such transactions are par for the course.

However, since the law exists, it must be followed. Since 2018, FPI disclosures have been limited to the definition of beneficial owner set under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). SEBI itself has admitted that FPIs have followed the letter of the law. However, as the Supreme Court-appointed committee suggests, SEBI was investigating the beneficial ownership of certain FPIs despite their compliance with the law. Why then did SEBI need to pursue this matter? Was SEBI overstepping its mandate in this pursuit? This is an important question raised by the Supreme Court-appointed committee that needs to be discussed more seriously. If India wants access to global capital, then the rules in India cannot be orders of magnitude more stringent than their global counterparts. While we may be correct in thinking that we are a big and attractive market, there may be a point where the costs of regulatory compliance, especially owing to the regulator overstepping its mandate, may overshadow any benefits to investors.

SEBI’s approach

The reasons for the two agencies concerned with ultimate ownership — SEBI, and the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) 2005 — are different. SEBI should come at the ultimate ownership of funds in an FPI from the perspective of whether there is a violation of the MPS norms. The ED may want to know the ownership of FPIs for reasons that may have to do with the flow of funds for money laundering or terror financing. SEBI should therefore concern itself with knowing the composition of ownership of FPIs from its narrow perspective. The desire for complete surveillance of all activities based on an implicit suspicion needs to be questioned. SEBI had adopted the definition of an ‘ultimate owner’ from the PMLA. This is the correct approach, and SEBI should persist with it.

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