Wednesday, January 18, 2023

Catastrophe insurance’ becomes more urgent after Joshimath. Fiscal transfers can’t rebuild lives

No specific natural disaster policy is sold in India. It is part of regular fire insurance that covers damage to the property from flooding, cyclone, etc.

18 January, 2023
The Print

The catastrophe in Uttarakhand’s Joshimath is one in the long list of environmental disasters, often exacerbated by human negligence, to strike India. Some of the economic losses could have been avoided had we followed warnings from environmental risk assessments and better construction standards. Losses are, however, inevitable when disaster strikes. How best to allocate these losses should become a core concern of public policy, given India’s exposure to climate change. Our toolkit for dealing with disasters needs to be fortified through catastrophe insurance.

Why catastrophe insurance?

India is vulnerable to natural disasters, with almost 75 per cent districts classified as extreme event hotspots. It is not feasible to provide financial support in the aftermath of a disaster only through fiscal tools. Fiscal transfers to households may not be enough to repair and rebuild properties and livelihoods.

It is useful to quantify ‘contingent liability’ on the government from disasters. That is, assuming the current trend of earthquakes, cyclones, and floods continues, what is the expected financial outflow of governments? Can a part of this liability be transferred to private insurance markets? The core business of insurance is to manage risk. Consider an insurance company that has sold earthquake insurance in all parts of India. When an earthquake strikes one location, it has to make payouts only in that location. It is, therefore, diversified.

However, the insurance company does have to make a payout to all policyholders in the earthquake-affected region. In that sense, it still is not able to diversify risks the way it is able to do in, say, life insurance or auto insurance products. The insurance company charges households a premium based on the annual expected loss—that is, the payout it expects to make given the probability of the event and the severity of the loss it can cause—and the administrative cost of providing the cover. The company, in turn, buys insurance from international reinsurance companies. This is important because a natural disaster with high losses has the potential to bankrupt a single firm.

The catastrophe insurance market in India

There is no specific earthquake (or natural disaster) policy sold in India. It is generally part of a standard fire insurance policy that covers damage to the property from events such as flooding, cyclone, fire etc. Earthquake protection can be purchased as an add-on. Households often do not know of these products or have a low assessment of the extent of their exposure. It could also be that trust in insurance firms is low, and one is never really sure of the extent of coverage one is signing up for.

Insurance companies, in turn, may not want to push for the sale of these policies because they risk losing significant capital if a catastrophic event occurs and claims have to be paid. Good pricing requires high-quality data that allows for modelling the probability of an adverse event as well as estimating potential losses. Such datasets are likely to not be available for India, making pricing difficult for the domestic and international reinsurance market. Uncertainty causes insurers to set aside excess loss reserves, leading to an increase in premiums.

Government-facilitated insurance

These problems are not unique to India. In 1995, the US state of California faced a similar issue, whereby 93 per cent of the local homeowners insurance market had either restricted or stopped writing homeowners policies altogether. The California legislature then created a no-frills policy that a private insurer could sell. In 1996, it also set up a not-for-profit, publicly managed and privately funded entity, the California Earthquake Authority (CEA), which offers earthquake insurance policies through certain insurance providers. Similarly, in 2000, the Turkish government started the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP), which provides earthquake insurance up to a specific ceiling. TCIP is managed as a private insurance company under the guidance of the Turkish treasury.

A wide range of public-private partnerships, which offer some element of catastrophe insurance, have emerged worldwide. In some countries, the government has assumed the role of a ‘direct insurer’ by setting up funds, such as the Earthquake Commission in New Zealand. In other markets, governments play the role of ‘reinsurer’— such as the Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation in Australia and the National Catastrophe Insurance Fund in Thailand. The type of insurance offered also varies, from residential property damage to commercial property damage and business interruption. There are also different models to ensure that the funding and governance of these entities do not impose new burdens on the government budget either through poor pricing or mismanagement of funds.

Developments in India include a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Nagaland State Disaster Management Authority, Tata AIG General Insurance Company Limited, and Swiss Re (as a reinsurance partner). The goal is to provide coverage for excess rainfall events that can cause severe flooding in the Northeastern state. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) also seems to be considering an index-insurance type solution for the livelihood protection of low-income households in the event of a natural calamity. The outcomes of these critical initiatives may well shape the future of catastrophe insurance in India.

State governments should consider the possibility of setting up a public-private partnership and harnessing the power of financial markets. There are crucial decisions to be taken on the design of the product, pricing, and investment management. As each state evaluates the model suited to its need, it should crowd in the private insurance industry and ensure financial sustainability.

Wednesday, January 4, 2023

Guaranteed pension returns offering protection at cost of value will hurt India growth story

Assured returns may give a degree of comfort and perhaps increase confidence in the NPS. But the price we pay for safety is high.

04 January, 2023
The Print

The Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority of India recently announced the Minimum Assured Return Scheme under the National Pension Scheme. The exact rate of guaranteed return is still being decided. MARS will be offered to all government employees after approval from the Union government. Assured returns may give a degree of comfort and perhaps increase confidence in the NPS. However, guarantees come at a cost. The price we pay for safety is high.

A defined contribution pension fund is a pass-through intermediary. It invests contributions based on the member’s choice of scheme. For withdrawals, it redeems units at the current rate and passes money back to the member. There is no risk of solvency in this setup. But all this changes with a guarantee. The pension fund now has to manage contributions in such a way that if returns fall below the guarantee, it makes up for the shortfall. This has two effects.

First, the schemes it offers will have to be more conservative, as it doesn’t want to risk losing money in a downturn. This will limit the upside. The member may now not get returns below a threshold, but they are unlikely to get too much above it either. There is a trade-off between how much protection one wants versus the value of pension at retirement. The more we protect the downside, the lower the final value of the pension. If the growth story of India unfolds, letting go of the upside will be a huge cost.

Second, pension funds will have to retain some reserves so that they do not go bust. In fact, the introduction of the guarantee has been delayed because the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA) is yet to arrive at the revised capital requirements for pension funds. Higher capital requirements will imply an increase in the fees that are charged to members. This further dampens the returns that may be possible. Solvency risk is a serious concern with funds that provide guaranteed returns. The guarantee actually introduces a risk that did not exist before.

NPS implementation

It is useful to step back and understand how certain choices regarding the NPS may have led to the demand for guaranteed returns. This was the original idea behind the NPS: Pension funds would offer three broad schemes with varying degrees of equity exposure. Members would choose the scheme and how much to allocate to each. A person who doesn’t mind market risk would choose a scheme with high equity exposure. Someone who doesn’t appreciate risk would choose a scheme that largely invests in government bonds. This design helps to keep costs low, which translates to higher returns. But it also means that people retiring in similar positions may end up having very different pension outcomes based on the investment choices they make.

This simple structure of the NPS was gradually diluted over the years. Government employees were not given the choice of schemes, perhaps because authorities feared equities, members could be financially illiterate, or those different pension outcomes were considered unacceptable. Their contributions were invested in the three public sector fund managers with an 85 per cent allocation to bonds and up to 15 per cent allocation to equity. Even though the returns delivered by the NPS have been higher than most other similar funds, they could have been higher had there been more investment in equities. It is important for us to evaluate the impact of these conservative investment choices on the performance of the scheme for government employees and how this may also have played into the demand for guaranteed returns.

The guarantee also raises other challenges for the NPS design. How are the guarantees going to be paid for — through upfront costs, deduction on the surplus above the guaranteed amount, or something else? Will members be allowed to switch between schemes of different fund managers if they choose the guaranteed return product? We will have to wait for more clarity on the scheme design before these can be addressed.

The desire for guaranteed returns

The PFRDA must know the cost of providing a guarantee. And yet, the PFRDA Act 2021 compels the authority to require pension funds to offer one. This takes us to the larger question of the demand for guaranteed returns.

When there is a lot of background risk in life — whether it is labour income or health — people become risk-averse about their finances. When customers lose money through fraud by either unregulated or regulated market products, it becomes difficult to distinguish between fraud risk and market risk. Consumers in India have also been accustomed to guaranteed returns through government-run schemes starting from the Old Pension Scheme, small savings schemes, public provident fund, or even the Employees Provident Fund.

High guaranteed returns are possible only when all tax-payers finance a tiny fraction of the workforce as is the case with the Old Pension Scheme. When the number of beneficiaries is larger — as is the case with small savings schemes or the public provident fund — guarantees reduce the effective rates of return. As NPS subscribers will also soon realise, there is no free lunch.

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